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PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
to be an attorney one must be a judge, then he does not have to be.
The effect of this decision will be to change the Justice Court System
in California. Henceforth, all criminal tribunals where there is a poten-
tial jail sentence, will have to be presided over by an attorney judge.
This decision does not affect the lay judge in deciding civil cases or
in criminal cases where there is not a possibility of a jail sentence. The
decision does permit a defendant or his counsel to waive the require-
ment of an attorney judge. To meet these requirements, the California
court system will have to be changed to docket the criminal cases that
this decision covers under attorney judges. New attorney judges may
have to be elected to meet this demand.
The most distinguishing characteristic of the Gordon case is that the
court has decided that time and the perplexity of criminal trials have
changed the requirements of due process in criminal trials. The com-
plexity of criminal trials today requires a judge to be able to understand
and differentiate among the fine points of law which may distinguish
one case from another. The ability to make this determination comes
from a combination of common sense and formal legal training.
Due process requires more than common sense determinations of le-
gal questions. Due process requires a judgment pursuant to the law.
A common sense judgment that is not pursuant to the law is arbitrary
and violates due process. Some non-attorney judges through personal
research and learning may acquire the expertise necessary to conduct
a trial that meets constitutional requirements. However, there should
be some safeguard against non-attorneys without these capabilities.
This can be done only by requiring judges to meet higher standards
as the court has done here. This court has taken a positive step for-
ward in refining the law and assuring the accused that, in the future,
he will receive a fair, impartial and competent trial from a tribunal that
is in step with the requirements of modern day due process.
JULIAN T. PIERCE
Photographic Evidence: or, Is a Picture Really Worth a Thousand
Words in North Carolina Courtrooms?
A recent case handed down by the North Carolina Supreme Court
may have a profound impact on the law governing admissability of
photographs for other than illustrative evidence. In State v. Foster',
I. State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973).
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the Court held that photographs of fingerprints could be introduced as
substantive evidence in a criminal prosecution for burglary. Although
confining the opinion specifically to photographs of fingerprints', Hus-
kins, J., has opened the door to reversal or modification of North Caro-
lina case law that has stood substantially intact since 1929.1
The present case involved one Foster, who had been convicted of
first degree burglary in a lower court on the testimony of a fingerprint
expert. The expert's testimony was based upon photographs of latent
fingerprints found on a flowerpot at the scene of the crime. The ori-
ginal fingerprints, preserved on a three-by-five white index card, had
been misplaced by the clerk of the lower court subsequent to the first
trial. The lower court allowed both the testimony of the expert and
the photographs to be admitted as substantive evidence. Foster ap-
pealed, contending that the photographs were incorrectly admitted as
substantive evidence, consequently rendering the expert's testimony
based on such evidence incompetent.
The prime controversy in the Foster case arose as a result of the
atrophy of one of the two rules under which photographic evidence had
historically been admitted in North Carolina courts. Under one rule,
photographs could be admitted as substantive evidence-as mute wit-
nesses submitted to the jury for their conclusions. Another rule called
for the use of photographs to be limited to the illustration of the testi-
mony of a duly sworn witness.4 Most present day writers discount the
dichotomy, 5 suggesting that the two rules are merely separate sides of
the same coin. Problems began to surface in North Carolina, however,
when the latter "rule" was stressed to the exclusion of the former be-
ginning with the 1929 decision of Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Com-
pany.'
Honeycutt concerned an action for injuries resulting from plaintiff's
falling into a ditch on defendant's property. 7 Photographs were taken
two years after the accident, at a time when the offending ditch had
been eliminated. The Court held the photographs not relevant to the
injury sustained by the plaintiff, but allowed their use in explaining the
testimony of the witness.8 Clark, J., dissented from the opinion, ar-
guing that any competent photograph should be submitted to the jury
for its consideration and weighted by other facts placed in evidence.9
2. Id. at 272, 200 S.E.2d at 792.
3. Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Co., 196 N.C. 556, 146 S.E. 227 (1929).
4. McKELVEY, EVIDENCE, § 378 (5th ed. 1944).
5. STANSBuRY, TiE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 34 (Brandies rev.
1973); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 214 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK].
6. Honeycutt v. Brick Co., 196 N.C. 556, 146 S.E. 227 (1929).
7. Hampton v. The Norfolk and Western R.R., 120 N.C. 534, 27 S.E. 96 (1897).
8. Id. at 537, 27 S.E. at 97.
9. Id. at 540, 27 S.E. at 98.
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Davis v. Railroad Co.1 ° in 1904, gave Clark (then C. J.) a chance
to express his view in a majority opinion. Speaking of photographs of
the injuries of the victims, he ruled that photographs "convey informa-
tion to the jury and court with an accuracy not permissible to spoken
words if their admission is properly guarded as to the time and manner
when taken.""1
Pickett v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.12 and Hoyle v. City of
Hickory3 served to keep in balance the two rules of admissability.
Both opinions involved water damage to real property. In the first
case, photographs of damaged land were held admissable to illustrate
the testimony of a witness. 4 The Hoyle case, however, held that the
photographs themselves were competent as explanatory of other testi-
mony and were, therefore, to be regarded as substantive. 5
Two years after the Hoyle decision, Allen, J. modified the Court's
stance by holding that photographs were admissable as substantive evi-
dence when shown to be a true representation of that which they pur-
port to depict.' 6 In no uncertain terms, the Court was returned to the
earlier opinions expounded by Clark that permitted almost any compe-
tent photograph to be submitted into evidence.
State v. Jones'7 presented a novel application of photographic evi-
dence and served to further the illustrative rule. The case revolved
around several photographs of various items which a witness testified
could be assembled into an illegal distillery. Since it was necessary
to introduce the photographs themselves into evidence, the Court rou-
tinely ruled them competent to illustrate the witness's testimony. The
Court, in this instance, held that the photographs were somewhat akin
to charts and diagrams used for explanatory purposes.' Clark, C. J.,
defending his position that competent photographs should be admitted
as substantive evidence, wrote in a concurring opinion that the danger
of equating photographs with charts and diagrams could possibly rele-
gate the former to the position of merely illustrating the testimony of
witnesses in succeeding controversies.' 9
Indeed, the Chief Justice's fears were about to materialize. In the
ten years between Jones and Honeycutt, only one case allowed photo-
10. Davis v. Railroad Co., 136 N.C. 115, 48 S.E. 591 (1904).
11. Id. at 116, 48 S.E. at 591.
12. Pickett v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 153 N.C. 148, 69 S.E. 8 (1910).
13. Hoyle v. City of Hickory, 167 N.C. 619, 83 S.E. 738 (1914).
14. Pickett v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 153 N.C. at 149, 69 S.E. at 9.
15. Hoyle v. City of Hickory, 167 N.C. at 622, 83 S.E. at 739.
16. Bane v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 171 N.C. 328, 88 S.E. 477 (1916).
17. State v. Jones, 175 N.C. 709, 95 S.E. 576 (1919).
18. Id. at 710, 95 S.E. at 578.
19. Id.
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graphs to be introduced as substantive evidence. State v. Lutterloh2 °
involved the admission of photographs to show the width and topog-
raphy of the roads where a traffic accident occurred. In addition to
the substantive content, the photographs were also allowed to be used
for illustrative purposes by witnesses to convict a "colored" man of
manslaughter by automobile. Curiously enough, in an immediately
subsequent case,2' the Court held that photographs of the scene of the
crime could only be used to illustrate the witness's testimony. Like-
wise, two years later, the Court reaffirmed its position by allowing
photographs of the relative positions of the deceased, the slayer, and
the witnesses in a murder trial to be used to illustrate the testimony
of the witnesses.2"
The fact situations in Lutterloh, Mitchem, and Matthews arguably
could support either position-admission as substantive or illustrative
evidence. However, departure from the dichotomy came inexplicably
and with a finality that was to last for forty-five years with the decision
of Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Company."
The photograph involved in Honeycutt showed the unprotected gears
of a mud machine in which a worker had been crushed to death. The
lower court judge had admitted the photograph as substantive evidence
giving mute witness as to the inherent danger of operating the machine.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held the admission of the photograph
as error and reversed the decision of the lower court. In analyzing the
Honeycutt case, Gardner in his cogent article, "The Camera Goes to
Court, '2 4 reports that appellant's counsel cited only cases favoring the
illustrative rule, stating that no others could be found. Counsel for ap-
pellee cited no cases on the point. The Court's opinion was based only
on the cases cited by appellant; consequently, a case that should have
clearly been controlled by Davis and Lutterloh was controlled by their
antitheses-Pickett and Jones.5
Following the doctrine outlined in Honeycutt, the use of photographs
only for illustrative purposes has been sustained in the following in-
stances: to show the machine which injured the plaintiff; 26 to show the
scene of the crime;27 to show the body of the deceased; 21 to show the
wounds on the body of a murder victim;" to show a traffic accident
20. State v. Lutterloh, 188 N.C. 412, 124 S.E. 190 (1924).
21. State v. Mitchem, 188 N.C. 608, 125 S.E. 190 (1924).
22. State v. Matthews, 191 N.C. 378, 131 S.E. 743 (1926).
23. Honeycutt v. Brick Co., 196 N.C. 556, 146 S.E. 227 (1929).
24. Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N.C.L. RaV. 233, 242-43 (1946).
25. Id. at 243.
26. Kelly v. Raleigh Granite Co., 200 N.C. 326, 156 S.E. 517 (1930).
27. State v. Perry, 212 N.C. 533, 193 S.E. 727 (1937).
28. Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee, 218 N.C. 320, 11 S.E.2d 341 (1940).
29. State v. Gardner, 228 N.C. 567, 46 S.E.2d 824 (1948).
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scene;"' and to show the positions of and damages to automobiles after
collision.3  This line of cases, however, is not unbroken. State v.
Cade32 in 1939 attempted to qualify Honeycutt by holding, through
Barnhill, J., that photographs could be admitted into substantive evidence
in the absence of a specific objection to restrict the photograph to illus-
trative purposes. The implications -are clear--only where the pictures
are irrelevant to the controversy, or where the opposing party's counsel
is so incompetent as to not recognize the importance of limiting the
evidentiary nature, of a photograph would the Cade qualification be
meaningful.
Until State v. Foster, the Cade case marked the end to the develop-
ment of North Carolina case law regarding the admission of photo-
graphs into evidence. With Foster comes the opportunity for North
Carolina to align herself with the majority of her sister states in this
area. Such a change has been suggested by authorities on evidence."
Foster is a definite break in the chain of precedents proceeding from
the Honeycutt decision. It proposes one of the two following alterna-
tives: either a return to the early days of photographic evidence in
North Carolina when such evidence could be admitted under either of
two rules-as substantive or illustrative evidence; or, in accordance
with many prominent writers,34 abolish entirely the distinction between
these two rules and admit all competent photographs as substantive evi-
dence to be qualified and weighted by a jury.
Although the Foster opinion specifically confines itself to photo-
graphs of fingerprints,35 it fails to elucidate how one is to distinguish
photographs of fingerprints from photographs of any other part of the
body, when shown by testimony to be a fair and accurate depiction of
the subject. Furthermore, why should one limit admissable photo-
graphs to parts of the body? Why should one not include photographs
of other easily identifiable (unique, if one must) animate 'and inani-
mate objects within the scope of substantive evidence?
The answers to the above questions become clear when one ex-
amines certain anomolies inherent in North Carolina's evidence rules.
For example, X-rays are readily admissable into evidence. The infor-
mation on the plate cannot be seen or verified with the naked eye; yet,
it has been held that a physician can testify substantively to the extent
30. Hawes v. Atlantic Refining Co., 236 N.C. 643, 74 S.E.2d 17 (1953).
31. State v. Norris, 242 N.C. 47, 86 S.E.2d 916 (1953).
32. State v. Cade, 215 N.C. 393, 2 S.E.2d 7 (1939).
33. McCoRMICK, § 214; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 790 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; 2 Scotr, P-OmTOGRoPmC EVIDENCE, § 1022 (2d ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as Scor].
34. MCCORMICK, § 214; WiGMORE, § 790; Scorr, § 1022.
35. State v. Foster, 284 N.C. at 272, 200 S.E.2d at 792 (1973).
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of a patient's injuries, such opinion being taken from X-rays not even
introduced into evidence.3 6  In addition, evidence gained by the use
of scientific instruments is admitted upon a showing that the instrument
and the procedures for operating it are recognized as standard by ex-
perts in the field. Presently, we treat the camera as producing less
accurate evidentiary information than the microscope, spectrometer, or
gas chromatograph. In the least this is inconsistent, as the results
each of these instruments can be affected by defective structural ele-
ments or by design of the operator. These are precisely the short-
comings of the camera. If the results of one kind of instrument are
admitted into substantive evidence upon their being shown as fair and
accurate representation, why are the results of another instrument with
approximately the same degrees of precision, relegated to the same evi-
dentiary positions as mere charts and diagrams?
Finally, the inconsistency of not allowing competent photographs to
be used as substantive evidence at trial is pointed out by Gardner's ex-
ample of absurdity fostered by the illustrative rule:
If a defective eye with a damaged optic nerve conveys an impression
(gained in twilight or under other deceptive conditions) to a diseased
brain, even after the eroding effects of weeks have advanced the
process of forgetting, the owner of the eye-though he may be a simple
soul of limited intelligence and even more limited vocabulary-will be
permitted to describe in court what he thinks that he remembers
he saw; but if a camera with cold precision and absolute fidelity re-
cords the view permanently and with minute accuracy that view is
kept from the jury, perhaps (under the Honeycutt case), or its use is
sharply circumscribed (under the "illustration" rule).37
Perhaps the Court by its opinion in State v. Foster has opened the
door to a more realistic approach regarding admissability of photograph-
ic evidence at trial. At the present time, very few jurisdictions hold with
North Carolina that photographs can only illustrate testimony of a wit-
ness.3 8 The great majority of jurisdictions throughout the country (and
indeed, throughout the world, in common law countries)39 permit the
admissibility of photographs for substantive purposes, subject to a
showing that they truly represent that which they depict.4"
36. State v. Norris, 242 N.C. at 54-55, 86 S.E.2d at 921 (1953).
37. Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N.C.L. REv. 233, 245 (1946).
38. But cf. Foster v. Bilbruck, 20 Ill. App. 2d 173, 155 N.E.2d 366 (1959).
39. See Wigmore, § 792, n.1 for a listing of English, Canadian, and Philipino court
cases.
40. See e.g., Santa Clara Val. Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson, 41 Cal. Rptr.
846, 231 Cal. App. 2d 366 (1964); Lepri v. Town of Branford, 152 Conn. 210, 205
A.2d 486 (1964); Coyner Crop Dusters v. Marsh, 90 Ariz. 157, 367 P.2d 208 (1961);
LaVallie v. General Insurance Co. of America, 17 Wis. 2d 522, 117 N.W.2d 703 (1962);
Veneble v. Stockner, 200 Va. 900, 108 S.E.2d 380 (1965).
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The decision in State v. Foster would probably have been necessi-
tated in the near future because of an increasing reliance of police de-
partments on photographs of fingerprints of suspects transmitted from
other jurisdictions through photocopy machines connected by telephone
lines. This, however, should not be the prime motivating force toward
bringing North Carolina rules regarding photographic evidence into ac-
cord with sister jurisdictions. The first step has been made: pictures
of fingerprints can be admitted as substantive evidence. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina should, in future cases, extend the Foster doc-
trine to any photograph which is shown to be a true representation of
what it purports to depict. The jury, defendant, and prosecution all
deserve the clearest, most lucid forms of evidence at their disposal in
North Carolina courtrooms.
ROBERT J. HENSLEY, JR.
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